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Abstract.  We examine the issue of pledging collateral and its eff ect on access to credit, inter-
est rates and credit risk of SMEs fi nancing in Bangladesh with respect to bank size. We 
also examine the collateral classifi cation (fi xed assets collateral, personal guarantee and 
third-party guarantee) by bank ownership types to fi nd what types of collateral are pre-
ferred by public, private and foreign banks in Bangladesh for lending to fi rms. In ad-
dition to that, we examine whether collateral requirements are diff erent between large 
and small banks as they have diff erent incentives for collateral based lending. Our em-
pirical results suggest that small banks have no additional incentives to provide loans 
based on the collateral security than  large banks. Hence, we did not fi nd any evidence 
that collateral can increase  access to credit for SMEs from  small banks. Similarly, we 
also did not fi nd any eff ect of collateral on interest rates or collateral security can lower 
the default rates of the SME loans and the results are similar regardless  bank size. 
With regards to  collateral segmentation across  bank ownership types and bank size, 
our regression’s results suggest that each type of banks has its  own preferences about 
collateral requirements while lending to  fi rms. Th erefore, we conclude that depending 
on  bank internal policy commercial banks ask for diff erent collateral, which comply 
with the best interests of  banks.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Diffi  culties in getting easy access to fi nance are treated as one of the foremost barriers to the develop-
ment of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) not only in  developing countries but also in  developed 
countries due to information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.  Pledging collateral is often treated 
as an eff ective mechanism to easing the access to fi nance due to personal commitments with  pledged as-
sets. Collateral requirements for lending to SMEs are even more serious in  underdeveloped countries due 
to strong information asymmetry and also  weak legal enforcement (Hainz, 2003; Menkhoff  et al., 2006). 
Menkhoff  et al. (2012) fi nd that SME borrowers in  less developed economies have  lower level of collateral-
izable assets to pledge as a security by  banks and thus, the probability of credit rationing is higher for  SMEs 
in the less developed economies. Beck et al. (2006) use the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) 
and fi nd that collateral requirements are the third most important diffi  culty in fi nancing for SMEs while 
high interest rates and lack of long-term loans are the fi rst and  second ones. In the context of Bangladesh, 
Hoque et al. (2016) found that 44.5% of their respondents did not apply for bank loans due to being un-
able to pledge collateral and therefore, they had a fear to get rejection  on a  loan application. Berger et al. 
(2011) stated that the main reason why banks ask for collateral while lending to SMEs is mainly due to the 
ex-ante information gap between lenders and borrowers and if the information gap can be shortened it will 
also reduce the collateral requirement for  SMEs .   
Several studies show that  lending for  SMEs is more  diffi  cult than for  large fi rms due to information 
asymmetry and therefore, it requires a relationship to be developed between a bank and a  fi rm to know 
more about them (Berger and Udell, 2002, 2005; Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Berger and Black, 2011). Th e 
research based on the “small bank advantage” hypothesis suggests that small banks are more effi  cient in 
lending to SMEs than  large banks due to their advantage in processing soft information, because of their 
simple organizational structure (Carter et al., 2004; Canales and Nanda, 2012; Berger et al., 2005; Kano 
et al., 2006; Shen et al., 2009).  In contrast to  small banks’ relationship-based loans, large banks prefer to 
provide loans based on  hard fi nancial information because it is diffi  cult for  large banks to make frequent 
contact with  SMEs (Cole et al., 2004). Moreover, relationship-based lending is not the most economical 
way of lending for  large banks due to agency issues within  large banking structures, namely,  delegating 
more authority to  loan offi  cers (Berger and Udell, 2002). 
 In this paper, we argue that as  small banks have lower asset base than  large ones , hence, small banks 
will provide more loans based on collateral than  large banks due to the potential loss if  borrowers are de-
fault. Th erefore, there are incentives for  small banks to provide credits based on pledged collateral. However, 
as  large banks do not have capital constraint, they will prefer to provide loans based on strict loan screening 
process. Th us,  collateral will not have any signifi cant impact on  access to credit from  large banks. Similarly, 
we assume  that as  small banks keep a close contact with  SMEs than  large banks, it will enable  small banks 
know more about their potential SME borrowers and it could help  reducing the default rates. On the other 
hand, we also assume that  collateral will signal positive information about  borrowers’ quality and it may 
reduce the interest rates on  loans . Nevertheless, the literature does not provide enough evidence on whether 
the availability of collateral can play any incentives’ roles for  small or large banks while providing loans as 
a result of their organizational diseconomies. 
In this study we also try to understand the collateral requirements in terms of fi xed assets, personal guar-
antee and third party guarantee across  bank ownership types (private, public and foreign banks) as well as 
from the bank size perspective for the credit market in Bangladesh during the year 2014. Studies show that 
lending practices are diff erent across  banks’ organizational structures due to diff erent organizational incen-
tives (Liberti and Mian, 2009). Mian (2003) argued that not all types of banks have similar credit expertise 
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thus, collateral requirements are also diff erent across  banks’ types. Th erefore, it is important to shed light 
on whether collateral requirements vary  due to  banks’ ownership structure as well as due to  diff erences in 
bank size in the case of Bangladesh.
 Our empirical results suggest  there is no signifi cant diff erence  between  small and large banks in terms 
of demanding for  collateral and giving SMEs access to  loans. Hence, with regards to  bank size, we did not 
fi nd any evidence on the ability of pledging collateral by the SMEs and access to  loans. Furthermore, we 
did not fi nd any plausible evidence that  collateral can reduce  interest rates on  SME loans from the bank 
size perspective.  Similarly, our results do not support the view that collateralized loans are less riskier than 
non-collateralized ones  and also any bank size idiosyncratic diff erence in credit risk of SMEs. Regarding 
the collateral segmentation across  banks’ sizes and bank ownership types, our regression results suggest that 
foreign banks demand  lower fi xed asset’s collateral than  public and private banks. On the other hand, the 
large banks demand for higher fi xed assets as collateral than the small banks. Moreover,  private banks accept 
lower level of third party guarantee as collateral. However, our results for personal guarantee as collateral is 
not signifi cant across  bank size and also across ownership structure.  
Our paper is diff erent from the existing literature at least in two ways.  First of all, we examine the issue 
of pledging collateral and access to credit from the bank size perspective since small and large banks have 
diff erent lending techniques. Secondly, we examine the collateral requirements and credit risk of SMEs in 
the context of low-income country like Bangladesh. Th e rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 
provides theoretical and empirical literature on  collateral requirements and our hypotheses. In Section 3 we 
present our data and the methodology. Section 4 documents our empirical results and discussions. Finally, 
in section 5 we provide concluding remarks.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Th e use of collateral on loan contract is a widespread phenomenon by banks while lending to 
SMEs. Davydenko and Franks (2008) found that 75.7% loans are secured in France and while they observed 
that 88.5% loans are secured in Germany. Similarly, Degryse and Cayseele (2000) show that 26% of loans 
are secured in Belgium. In the case of the USA, Steijvers et al. (2010) fi nd that about 87% loans are secured 
with various types of collateral and with some covenants. Menkhoff  et al. (2012) fi nd that around 15% of 
loans are secured in Th ailand. 
 In 2007, the World Bank conducted an enterprise survey among 560 small and medium enterprises 
in Bangladesh to understand the collateral requirements by the commercial banks.  Th e survey results show 
that 67.14 per cent of SMEs provided land and buildings as collateral to get access to the bank loans. On 
the other hand, about 43 per cent SMEs provided personal assets and about 29 per cent fi rms provided 
equipment and machinery as collateral. However, only 3.39 per cent fi rms pledged accounts receivables 
as collateral (World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2007). Hence, the results suggest that commercial banks in 
Bangladesh are comfortable to provide SME loans when they are secured with the fi xed assets as collateral. 
With regards to the less developed economies, Feder et al. (1988) analyses the use of collateral and ac-
cess to credit in three developing countries (India, Th ailand and Korea) and it is found that political, social 
and legal issues may infl uence the use of collateral in Korea. On the other hand, pledging collateral is legal 
in Th ailand and India. However, excessive use of land collateral certainly reduce bank creditworthiness as-
sessment cost for the banks. In Th ailand, the use of collateral can increase the access to credit by 40% in 
compared to loans those without any collateral. In examining the potential substitutes for collateral require-
ments in Th ialand, Menkhoff  et al. (2012) fi nd that about 11% of the borrowers are credit constraints and 
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rest of the borrowers borrow without any collateral. La Porta et al. (2003) show that the relationship banking 
can reduce the use of collateral and similarly loans provided based on the relationship lending are more risky 
in the Mexican loan market.  Godlewski and Weill (2011) examine the eff ect of information asymmetry on 
loan spread and collateral in 31 countries where about half of them are developed countries. Th e result show 
that there is a positive relationship exists between the use of collateral and loan spread and hence, validating 
the observed risk hypothesis.              
Th ere is a wide array of research shows that collateral is acting as a disciplinary role for the borrowers, 
and it can solve the moral hazard problem of the loans (Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Menkhoff  et al., 2006; 
2012; Brick and Palia, 2007). On the other hand, research based on ex-ante information shows that the 
collateral can reduce the adverse selection problem of the loans (Godlewski and Weill, 2011; Jimenez and 
Saurina, 2009; Hainz et al., 2013; Jimenez et al., 2006; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001). However, Blazy 
and Weill (2013) did not fi nd any evidence that the collateral can reduce the ex-ante and ex-post informa-
tion asymmetry, and hence asking for collateral is not due to information asymmetry, but it may be due to 
bank internal policy while lending to fi rms. Jimenez and Saurina (2004) fi nd that the loans given based on 
collateral security are more ex-post riskier than the loans given without any collateral. Th ey infer that due to 
the collateral, banks are less restrictive to evaluate the quality of the loans and as a result, their default rates 
are higher than the non-collateralized loans. 
 Collateral is seen as a signalling device for the banks to know about the borrowers’ quality and hence, 
pledging collateral can reduce the credit risk of the loans by increasing access to the credits.  On the other 
hand, it is also possible that poor borrowers will provide more collateral because of their capital constraints 
and also for credit rationing from other sources (Gama and Duarte, 2015). Information asymmetry is even 
acuter in the segment of SMEs and hence, pledging collateral is higher for the small and medium fi rms than 
the large fi rms due to inability to show their credit worthiness (Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Grunert and 
Norden, 2012). Gama and Duarte (2015) fi nd that as there is an incentive for collateralized borrowers to 
act in the best interest of the banks and therefore, pledging collateral can increase access to fi nance for small 
businesses. Menkhoff  et al. (2012) examined the issue of collateral in the context of less-developed country 
(Th ailand) and show that there is a positive relationship exists between pledging collateral and access to 
credit. Neuberger and Rathke-Doppner (2015) also found similar results in the German market and con-
clude that when fi rms pledge collateral, it increases access to credits from banks.  On the other hand, there 
is empirical research those do not fi nd any relationship between pledging collateral, and access to credits 
(Kundin and Erecgovac, 2011; Ono and Usegi, 2009). 
 Th e literature also shows evidence that by pledging collateral borrowers will show their ability of repay-
ment, and they can ask for bank loans with lower interest rates. Gama and Duarte (2015) and Comeig et 
al. (2015) proposed that when borrowers are pledging collateral they can access loans with lower interest 
rates and hence; they argue that quality borrowers pledge more collateral to avail loans with lower interest 
rates. Blazy and Weill (2013) fi nd that high collateral measures the poor quality of the borrowers and hence, 
interest rate increases with the amount of collateral. Th eory based on the observed risk hypothesis is also 
suggesting similar results. It is found that when information asymmetry is lower, in that case, banks can 
measure the riskiness of the borrowers more accurately and therefore, banks will ask for higher collateral and 
also higher interest rates from the risky borrowers. Th erefore, a positive relationship exists between collateral, 
interest rates and credit risk of the loan (Godlewski and Weill, 2011; Brick and Palia, 2007; Jimenez et al., 
2006). Brick and Palia (2007) observed that loans with higher levels of collateral charged with 200-400 
basis points more interest rates than the loans with lower or no collateral. Th erefore, it shows that when the 
information gap is lower banks can evaluate the riskiness of the fi rm with more accuracy and if fi rms are 
riskier, they are charged with more interest rates. 
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 Beck et al. (2011) fi nd that foreign banks and the large public banks tend to provide the loans with col-
lateral and giving less importance to the soft and relationship based information. Beck et al. conclude that 
regardless of the bank ownership type, large banks use more arms-length lending, and so they ask for more 
collateral from the SMEs. In contrast, Jimenez et al. (2009) show that technology based credit scoring of 
large banks reduces collateral requirements for SMEs due to a strict screening process by the credit scoring 
models. Mian (2003) stated that government-owned banks have less screening and monitoring processes for 
loans, and therefore, they require higher collateral. Likewise, government-owned banks have more default 
rates on the loan contract which are higher than the private or foreign banks. Conversely, it is possible to get 
loans with lower interest rates from the public banks as a result of political and hidden motives for lending to 
fi rms (Berger et al., 2008; Cole, 2009; Sapienza, 2004). With respect to foreign banks, it is stated that they 
are situated far from the local community, and it is diffi  cult for them to monitor the loans by keeping a close 
contract with the borrowers and as a result; foreign banks ask for more collateral while lending to SMEs 
(Mian 2009). Th us, depending on the bank ownership structure and bank size, collateral requirements are 
also diff erent based on banks internal policy, and it exerts diff erent outcomes in terms of access to credit and 
interest rates for SMEs.  
 A large number of studies show that the eff ect of market competition on collateral requirements 
for SMEs in connection with access to credit and interest rates. In examining the eff ect of competition, 
Voordeckers and Steijvers (2006) fi nd that when several banks are competing for the same borrowers, it 
reduces the collateral requirements for the borrowers. Since, to attract the borrowers to be with their banks, 
banks need to provide their best off ers, and it will ultimately reduce the collateral requirements. Menkhoff  
et al. (2006) fi nd that when a borrower has the opportunity to borrow from diff erent banks, it increases the 
bargaining power of the borrower and it results with a lower interest rate on the loan contract. Jimenez et al. 
(2009) fi nd that in a competitive market, banks ask for more collateral than it is in the concentrated market. 
Th e reason is that in a competitive market banks want to develop their holding power in the loan contract 
due to excessive switching behaviour of the borrowers. Hainz et al. (2013) argue that as the competition 
increases, banks prefers to use their best screening process due to a large number of lenders and as a result, 
strict screening process reduces the collateral incidence. Th ey also fi nd that the market competition reduces 
the interest rates on the loan contract due to a tighter process of the loan. Jimenez et al. (2009), Chakraborty 
& Hu (2006), Kozubíková et al. (2015) also document a positive relationship between market competition 
and collateral requirements for small business lending.   
Hypotheses
 In line with the research objectives, we also expect that there can be a signifi cant diff erence exists be-
tween bank size and its impact on collateral requirements and ultimately the eff ect of collateral requirements 
on the credit availability, interest rates and credit risk of SMEs. Hence, according to the expectation, our 
hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Th ere is a relationship between bank size and collateral on approval of credits to SMEs.
H2: Th ere is a relationship between bank size and collateral on lending interest rates to SMEs.
H3: Th ere is a relationship between bank size and collateral requirements on reducing SME credit risk.
H4: Th ere is a relationship between bank size and collateral on ex-post credit default rates on SMEs.
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 Th is study uses the data collected by a self-administered questionnaire survey during the month of June-
August in 2015 targeted to the banks credit offi  cers who are only dealing with SME fi nance. Purposively, 
we interviewed only SME credit offi  cers so that we can tease out the most essential information from them, 
what they consider while dealing with a loan proposal.  Th e initial target of the survey was to collect data 
at least from one credit offi  cer from all scheduled commercial banks those are operating in Bangladesh, 
which covers public (government-owned), private and foreign banks (total 56 scheduled commercial banks 
in Bangladesh). Finally, we have collected data from 110 credit offi  cers from 44 commercial banks, mainly 
from their diff erent branches operating in Dhaka city. 
We have classifi ed the size of the banks on the basis of the banks total assets. Bank total assets are also 
used in diff erent papers to diff erentiate between small and large banks (Berger et al., 2005; Uchida et al., 
2008; Shen et al., 2009). Bank total assets, total advance, collateral types and all other secondary data that 
we used for our analyses are collected from the audited fi nancial statements of the banks that are published 
in 2014. We did not use any fi nancial statements, which are not audited, as a result; we did not include any 
2015 interim fi nancial statements information in this paper.  
Th e study uses descriptive statistics such as mean to gain understanding about the bank’s size. In addi-
tion, this study applied Chi-square test in order to examine the hypotheses. Moreover, we adopted regression 
models to understand the overall collateral classifi cation (fi xed assets, personal guarantee and third-party 
guarantee) according to the bank size and bank ownership structure in the year of 2014.  
Regression Models:
(1) ln(Y(Fixed Assets)) = β0 + β1Private Banks + β2Foreign Banks + β3Small Banks  +μ
(2) ln(Y(Personal Guarantee)) = β0 + β1Private Banks + β2Foreign Banks + β3Small Banks +μ
(3) ln(Y(Th ird Party Guarantee)) = β0 + β1Private Banks+β2Foreign Banks + β3Small Banks +μ
Summary Statistics by Bank Sizes and Collateral 
 Table 1 presents the summary statistics of our full sample data of 44 banks as well as segmented analysis 
across the bank size from the total number of banks. Th ere is a signifi cant diff erence exists between banks 
fi xed assets collateral, which is comprised of land, equipment/machinery, and buildings from the personal 
guarantee (family assets) or third party guarantee to total advance ratio. Hence, it refl ects that banks in 
Bangladesh ask for more fi xed assets as a security than any other forms of collateral. Th e results are similar to 
the case of Th ailand as found by Menkhoff  et al. (2012). Since these fi xed assets are mainly connected with 
the businesses and banks are more secured with the fi xed assets than the personal or third party guarantee. 
Moreover, Bangladesh is a growing emerging economy as a result, values of lands and buildings are increas-
ing to a great extent each year. Th erefore, it is also convenient for banks to ask for fi xed assets as collateral 
because they can recover the defaulted loans by selling the collateralized assets easily.   
With regards to measuring the bank size, fi rst we calculate the mean value of total assets for our full 
sample, and then if the banks total asset is equal to or more than the mean of the full sample are considered 
as a large bank and otherwise, the banks are classifi ed as small banks. In table 1 we see that the small banks 
required about (9%) more fi xed assets to their total extended loans as compared to the large banks. As dis-
cussed elsewhere that small banks are more capital constraint than the large banks, thus to safeguard their 
capital against bad loans small banks require higher collateral. Similarly, we also fi nd that there is a signifi -
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cant diff erence exists between personal (20%) and third-party guarantee (10%) between the small and large 
banks. Th is result suggests that the small banks require higher collateral with respect to all types of collateral. 
We also run ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) tests to look at whether the mean diff erence is statistically 
signifi cant or not. In particular, the results of F-tests indicate that bank mean assets, mean advance is statisti-
cally signifi cantly diff erent from the bank size. However, mean fi xed assets collateral, personal guarantee and 
third party guarantee on SMEs are not statistically signifi cantly diff erent across the bank size.
Table 1
Characteristics of Banks on Collateral Requirements
 Bank Size
 All banks Small Large
Variable Mean F-Tests Mean Mean
Total Assets (BDT Million) 193140(180981) 31.2[0.000] 115350(124384) 305502(193584)
Total Advance (BDT Million) 103310(74522) 17.5[0.000] 57114(39273) 167470(63677)
Fixed Assets Collateral (BDT Million) 75829(62909) 1.22(0.27) 45275(36089) 118265(67438)
Personal Guarantee (BDT Million) 14991(19170) 2.51(0.12) 7830(10462) 24140(23409)
Third party Guarantee (BDT Million) 6483(7373) 1.76(0.19) 4802(7686) 8444(6459)
Fixed Assets to Total Advance Ratio (%) 73 77 68
Personal Guarantee to Total Advance Ratio (%) 29 37 17
Third party Guarantee to Total Advance 
Ratio (%) 11  15 5
All banks N= 44; Small banks N= 26; Large banks N=18. Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Source: Banks annual statements 2014. Authors’ calculations.
 In table 2, we present our survey results according to the bank size to understand whether the size of 
the bank matters for fi nancing SMEs. Th is is very important for our research because by this way, we can 
fi nd out some obvious reasons for banks to ask for more collateral from the SMEs. Th e survey result suggests 
that about 62% of respondents from the small banks think that SMEs are unstable and diffi  cult to evaluate 
their future business prospects. Similarly, about 59% credit offi  cers reported that SMEs have poor man-
agement, and that is why they ask for more collateral. However, from the large bank perspective, 77.23% 
respondent approved that management structure is poor in the case of SMEs than the large fi rms. Except, 
the poor management structure of SMEs all other results of the large banks are very similar to the result of 
the small banks. Overall, the results signals that the large banks are more concerned about the management 
structure of the SMEs while, small banks are more apprehensive about the stability and evaluation of the 
business. Th erefore, we argue that a strong management board may reduce the collateral requirements for 
SMEs from the large banks while increasing the stability of SMEs through better performance may lessen 
the collateral burden from the small banks.  Hence, both types of banks have diff erent evaluation criteria for 
SMEs and for setting collateral requirements.
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Table 2
Why banks ask for more collateral from SMEs than the large fi rms (indicate maximum three options)
 Small Banks in %
Large banks 
in %
SMEs are more unstable 62.26 52.25
SMEs are more informal so difﬁ cult to collect hard information 52.15 57.89
Evaluation of SMEs is difﬁ cult 62.64 56.14
Management of SMEs is poor 58.85 77.23
Calculation of default probability rate merely based on soft information, so it is 
difﬁ cult to measure for SMEs 58.50 56.14
Small banks N=26; Large banks N=18. 
Source: Authors own survey results.
 Table 3 presents the descriptions of the survey questions used to constructing the association between 
bank size and collateral for SMEs from 110 SME credit offi  cers, representatives from 44 banks in Bangladesh. 
Respondents were given fi ve points Likert scale questions to disclose their opinion about relationship lend-
ing that is ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (1 point) to ‘Strongly agree’ (5 points).  
We have constructed four questions to measure four hypotheses. At fi rst, we see that 50 per cent of 
our total respondent agree and 24.5 per cent respondent strongly agree that “Borrowers with collateral have 
much more chances to get loans from the bank”. Hence, the survey result suggests that having collateral 
while applying for loans do value by the credit offi  cers for extending loans. With regards to “Borrowers with 
collateral receive loans with lower interest rates” about 43 per cent respondent considers that collateral does 
have an impact on lowering interest rates, however, 31 per cent of them denied that collateral can reduce 
the interest rates. Furthermore, about 51 per cent respondents are agreed with the view that “My bank value 
collateral security as a signifi cant factor for SME credit risk”. Hence, it suggests that collateral security can be 
a signifi cant factor for banks to reduce the credit risk of the fi rms. Finally, the survey result shows that about 
56 per cent credit offi  cers approved that “SMEs with a higher level of collateral have defaulted less than the 
SMEs with lower/no collateral”. Th erefore, the survey result suggests that collateral can reduce the default 
rates of the SME loan due to personal commitments with the collateralized assets. Moreover, when SMEs 
pledges higher levels of collateral, it shows that they are more aligned with the interest of the banks than the 
fi rms those are having lower levels of collateral.
Table 3
Descriptions of the Survey Questions
Descriptions
Measurements/Categories
Strongly 
disagree Disagree
Neither
agree nor
disagree
Agree Strongly agree
1 2 3 4 5 6
Borrowers with collateral have much more 
chances to get loans from the bank.
3 (2.8) 13(11.8) 12(10.9) 55(50.0) 27(24.5)
Borrowers with collateral receive loans with lower 
interest rates.
7 (6.4) 34(30.9) 18(16.4) 47(42.7) 4(3.6)
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1 2 3 4 5 6
My bank value collateral security as a signiﬁ cant 
factor for SME credit risk.
2 (1.8) 12(10.9) 14(12.7) 56(50.9) 26(23.6)
SMEs with higher level of collateral have default-
ed less than the SMEs with lower/no collateral.
2(1.8) 15(13.6) 18(16.4) 61(55.5) 14(12.7)
Note: 5 = Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 1 = Strongly Disagree. Percentage values are in 
parentheses; N = 110.
Source: Authors’ survey.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Table 5
Test of Hypotheses
Bank Size
Chi-Square  
Value
P- 
Value
H1: Borrowers with collateral have more access to credit from the bank 5.674 0.23
H2: Borrowers with collateral receive loans with lower interest rates 1.108 0.89
H3: Collateral is considered as a signiﬁ cant factor for SME credit risk 2.971 0.56
H4: SMEs with collateral defaulted less than the SMEs without/lower levels of collateral 1.224 0.87
Source: Authors’ results.
 We test whether the availability of collateral can make any diff erence across the bank size while pro-
viding credits to SMEs because of small banks incentives to collateral based lending. Our empirical results 
suggest that there is no signifi cant diff erence exists between the small and large banks while lending to SMEs 
with collateral and therefore, we reject this hypothesis (H1). Hence, this result is suggesting that small and 
large banks are giving similar importance to collateral while lending to the SMEs. It can be that fact that 
small banks takes collateral from the borrowers to reduce the loan loss; however, collateral incentives does 
not insist the small banks to provide loans in a risky projects. As it is found that banks use collateral not only 
to reduce the asymmetric information problem but minimizing loan loss is one of the major concerns for 
banks to use collateral (Blazy and Weill, 2013; Menkhoff  et al., 2006). On the other hand, in our case; it is 
also possible that small banks have the similar credit expertise as like as the large banks and thus, they pro-
vide loans by a strict credit screening process than only to depend on the collateral security. Nevertheless, our 
inference is opposite to Jimenez et al. (2006, 2009) where they stated that small banks have limited credit 
expertise than the large banks and for that reason the small banks relay on collateral security to provide cred-
its to the SMEs. Additionally, as Bangladesh is a developing country and therefore, information asymmetry 
is comparatively higher than the developed countries due to lack of monitoring and enforcement. Hence, 
regardless of the bank size, commercial banks may ask for collateral to reduce the adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Moreover, small banks are specialized in relationship banking and they can evaluate the credit risk 
of the SMEs better than the large banks (Berger et al., 2001, 2005; Berger and Udell, 2002; Uchida et al., 
2012). Th erefore, in that case having collateral from the SMEs may not have any signifi cant incentives for 
the small banks to provide loans because they have already information advantage and which may allow 
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them to extend credits. Finally, we argue that large banks may have the similar incentives as like as the small 
banks to deliver loans based on collateral security due to ineffi  ciency in credit evaluation processes which 
arises from their organizational diseconomies (Canales and Nanda, 2012; Carter et al., 2004).
We test H2 in order to measure the eff ect of collateral on interest rates. Our result is not signifi cant 
across the bank size, and consequently, we reject the hypothesis (H2). Th is is suggesting that collateral can-
not reduce the interest rates and it is indiff erent regardless of the bank size. Th is result is not according to 
our expectation because we expected that having collateral will reduce the interest rates from the small banks 
because it will signal a positive information about the borrower’s credit quality since small banks have the 
information advantage. Jimenez et al. (2006) found a negative relationship between collateral and inter-
est rates because collateral signals a positive information about the credit quality.  Blazy and Weill (2013), 
Godlewski and Weill (2011) fi nd a positive relationship between collateral and credit risk of the borrower 
and hence having collateral increases interest rates. On the other hand, Hanedar et al. (2014) do not fi nd any 
relationship between having collateral and interest rates. However, in our case, it can be the fact that banks 
in Bangladesh are too much profi t oriented and therefore, regardless of the credit quality they do not charge 
lower interest rates. In contrast, it is also possible that only pledging collateral is not enough to show better 
credit quality, and therefore, small banks are not lowering the interest rates on the SME loans. Moreover, 
due to small bank’s information advantage in SME lending they can charge the appropriate interest rates 
with collateral and which is consistent with the theory of observed risk hypothesis (Goldewski and Weill, 
2011; Brick and Palia, 2007). 
We examine the importance of collateral in credit risk management of the SMEs across the bank size. 
We predicted that there will be a considerable diff erence exists in between the large and small banks in giving 
the priority of collateral in credit risk assessment of the SMEs due to small bank’s capital constraint or due to 
the small banks limited credit expertise. However, according to the result’s collateral is valued by both sizes 
of banks similarly for credit risk and no association is found for the bank size, and we reject this hypothesis 
(H3). Nonetheless, from the evidence, it may be the fact that collateral act as an incentive for both types of 
banks to secure their investment from bad loans (Menkhoff  et al., 2006; Blazy and Weill 2013). Moreover, 
as Jimenez et al. (2006, 2009) argue that large banks are more effi  cient in processing SME loans due to their 
advanced credit expertise. Th erefore, it is possible that large banks can evaluate the riskiness of the SMEs 
better than the small banks and due to that reason they are charging similar level of collateral as like as the 
small banks to compensate any credit default risk. 
In H4, we examined the association between SME default rates across the bank size with collateral. 
We expected that small banks SME loan default rates will be lower than the large banks due to the small 
banks close relationships with the fi rm when loan guaranteed with collateral. However, our results do not 
suggest any diff erence to the bank size and therefore, we reject the hypothesis (H4). Our results may signal 
that the collateral does not have any eff ect on reducing the adverse selection and moral hazard problem in 
the Bangladeshi banking sector and which is similar to the result of some other markets (Hanedar et al., 
2014; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004; Brick and Palia, 2007; Hainz et al., 2013). In our case, it is also possible 
that banks are not willing to screen the loans which have a substantial amount of collateral and thus small 
and large banks have similar default rates, because of less screening process (Jimenez and Saurina, 2004). 
Moreover, as small banks provide loans mostly based on relationship banking and, as a result, they may 
overestimate the quality of the loans due to the relationship (Jimenez and Saurina, 2004). From this point 
of view, it can be possible to say that relationship-based loans are naturally risky and collateral cannot reduce 
the default rates which may arise from the poor performance at the company. Finally, it can be the fact that 
due to our small sample size, we cannot capture the true situation regarding collateral and credit risk of the 
SMEs. 
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In table 6 we present our regressions results about the collateral classifi cation according to bank size 
and bank ownership structure to understand which types of collateral are mostly preferred by the banks for 
lending.
Table 6
Regressions results
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES ln(Fixed assets) ln(Personal Guarantee) ln(Third Party Guarantee)
Ref: Public Banks
Private Banks -1.049 -0.347 -1.699*
(0.684) (1.026) (0.936)
Foreign Banks -2.088** -0.0883 -2.405
(0.846) (1.430) (1.482)
Large Banks (Ref: Small Banks) 0.752* 0.556 0.216
(0.393) (0.604) (0.568)
Constant 11.37*** 8.671*** 9.462***
(0.734) (1.106) (1.014)
Observations 44 42 39
R-squared 0.23 0.034 0.12
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 With regards to the amount of fi xed asset’s collateral, the private banks require less collateral comparing 
with the public banks, but this is not statistically signifi cant. However, the result shows that foreign bank 
is statistically signifi cant at 5 per cent level indicating that the amount of collateral received by the foreign 
banks is 88.0 per cent less comparing with public banks. Our result is diff erent from the result of Beck et 
al. (2011) where they have shown that foreign banks provide more collateralized loans, and their collateral 
requirement is higher than the public and private banks. In our case, it can be the fact that foreign banks 
use more advanced credit scoring models, and they provide credits based on strict screening process and as 
a result; they require lower collateral. Moreover, most of the foreign banks in Bangladesh are big and hence, 
it is convenient for them to use technology-based lending and consequently, they will charge lower collateral, 
which is consistent with Jimenez et al. (2006). With respect to the size of the banks, the result of this study 
shows that large banks received a larger amount of fi xed assets as collateral, which is about 75 per cent higher 
than the small size banks and the result is statistically signifi cant at 10 per cent level. Th is result is according 
to our expectation. Since small banks have an information advantage in lending, therefore, small banks can 
ask for lower collateral (Berger et al., 2005; Kano et al., 2006; Uchida et al., 2012; Gama and Duarte, 2015).
With regards to the amount of personal guarantees as collateral, surprisingly this study found that both 
the type of bank and the size of the bank are statistically insignifi cant. Th us, the result suggests that personal 
guarantee does not diff er according to the bank size and also with bank ownership types. It can be the fact 
that personal guarantee does not have any signifi cance on the credit risk of the loan and therefore, banks 
ask for personal guarantee just to include more private property in the loan contract for safety. Steijvers et 
al. (2010) found that personal guarantee cannot reduce the credit risk of the loan as like as the business 
collateral. Th erefore, it may be possible that banks in Bangladesh ask for a personal guarantee to reduce 
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information asymmetry or to create superiority over the loan contract. Since, personal asset pledged to the 
bank can reduce agency seeking behaviour of the borrowers.
Finally, with regards to the amount of third party guarantees as collateral, the results reveal that the 
private bank variable is found to be statistically signifi cant at 10 per cent level. Th is indicates that the private 
banks require less amount of third party guarantee as collateral comparing with public banks in Bangladesh. 
However, the co-effi  cient of foreign banks shows that they also require less amount of third party guarantee 
as collateral comparing with the public banks but this is not statistically signifi cant. Th e result from the 
private bank perspective suggests that third party guarantee is not commonly accepted as collateral as like as 
the public or foreign banks. Th e private banks receive a signifi cantly lower amount of third party guarantee 
may be due to lack of monitoring of the guarantor or may be due to lack of enforcement (Hainz, 2003; 
Menkhoff  et al., 2006). However, more acceptance of third party guarantee by the public banks may be due 
to the political connection with their clients (Cole, 2009; Sapienza, 2004). 
Moreover, the large banks require higher amount of third party collateral comparing with the small size 
banks but again this is not statistically signifi cant. Hence, the fi rms capable of providing third party guar-
antees   might get access to the loans from the large banks but third party guarantee may not provide any 
extra benefi t with access to credits from the small banks. It can be the fact that small banks do not prefer to 
provide loans on the guarantee which is not personally attached with the borrowers. Since, it may insist the 
borrowers to take more risk as they do not have any personal commitment with the loans and as a result, it 
will increase the moral hazard problem.  Similarly, due to lack of physical presence of the collateral, it will 
be diffi  cult for the small banks to recover the loan if the loan defaults, and that will increase the capital risk 
to the bank. 
CONCLUSION
 In this paper, we empirically test the eff ect of bank size and bank ownership structure on the collateral 
requirements in the context of Bangladesh. Especially we test the hypotheses about pledging collateral and 
its eff ect on access to the credit, interest rates and credit risk of SMEs from the small and large bank perspec-
tive. Our results suggest that having collateral is not benefi cial for SMEs to have access to the credits from 
the small banks. Th erefore, it suggests that small banks have no additional incentives in collateral based lend-
ing. Similarly, we did not fi nd any eff ect of collateral on interest rates and credit risk of SMEs according to 
the bank size. Hence, pledging collateral is not going to be helpful to have loans with reduced interest rates 
for SMEs. Moreover, we did not fi nd any evidence on whether collateral helps to reduce the default rates of 
the SME loans. Th us, the collateral is more likely to be considered as a safety net for the banks rather than 
to prevent ex-post default rates of the loans.
While examining the collateral classifi cation according to bank size and ownership structure of the 
banks our result suggests that in some cases collateral requirements are diff erent according to the bank size 
and bank ownership structure. It can be the fact that, due to bank internal policy these collateral require-
ments are diff erent for lending to the fi rms. Because incentives for collateral are diff erent according to the 
collateral classifi cation and therefore, each bank has their own policy to treat the collateral which suites their 
best interest. 
From a policy perspective, our results are signifi cant to understand the eff ect of collateral on SME fi -
nance within the bank size perspective and also from diff erent banking organizational structure. Moreover, if 
the collateral does not provide any additional benefi ts to have access to fi nance or reduction in interest rates 
then it would be helpful for the fi rms should know about the requirements of the SME fi nance. However, 
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the regulatory bank in Bangladesh may advise the commercial banks to consider the loan applications more 
carefully and prevent them from higher collateral requirement. Consequently, it may lead to increase in 
accessing to the credit for the SMEs, and that it would have a positive impact on removing the fi nancing 
constraint for the start-up businesses and contributing to develop the economy of Bangladesh. 
Nevertheless, this paper has some limitations due to a small number of samples. More importantly, our 
sample does not cover all scheduled commercial banks available in Bangladesh.  Th erefore, we may leave out 
some interesting fi ndings from the other banks. Moreover, this study uses only one year (2014) fi nancial data 
of banks and therefore, we are unable to make any comments on how collateral requirements are changing 
over the years. For example whether collateral requirements have changed from the pre-crisis period to the 
post fi nancial crisis. Furthermore, we did not examine the eff ect of banking competition on the access to 
credit and credit risk of the SMEs and thus, we are leaving it for the potential future research.  
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